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Abstract
While microtask crowdsourcing provides a new way to solve large volumes of small tasks at a much
lower price compared with traditional in-house solutions, it suffers from quality problems due to the
lack of incentives. On the other hand, providing incentives for microtask crowdsourcing is challenging
since verifying the quality of submitted solutions is so expensive that will negate the advantage of
microtask crowdsourcing. We study cost-effective incentive mechanisms for microtask crowdsourcing
in this paper. In particular, we consider a model with strategic workers, where the primary objective of
a worker is to maximize his own utility. Based on this model, we analyze two basic mechanisms widely
adopted in existing microtask crowdsourcing applications and show that, to obtain high quality solutions
from workers, their costs are constrained by some lower bounds. We then propose a cost-effective
mechanism that employs quality-aware worker training as a tool to stimulate workers to provide high
quality solutions. We prove theoretically that the proposed mechanism, when properly designed, can
obtain high quality solutions with an arbitrarily low cost. Beyond its theoretical guarantees, we further
demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed mechanisms through a set of behavioral experiments.
Index Terms
Crowdsourcing, game theory, incentive, markov decision process, symmetric Nash equilibrium.
August 27, 2018 DRAFT
2I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing, which provides an innovative and effective way to access online labor mar-
ket, has become increasingly important and prevalent in recent years. Until now, it has been
successfully applied to a variety of applications ranging from challenging and creative projects
such as R&D challenges in InnoCentive [1] and software development tasks in TopCoder [2],
all the way to microtasks such as image tagging, keyword search and relevance feedback
in Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk) [3] or Microworkers [4]. Depending on the types of
tasks, crowdsourcing takes different forms, which can be broadly divided into two categories:
crowdsourcing contest and microtask crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing contests are typically used
for challenging and innovative tasks, where multiple workers simultaneously produce solutions
to the same task for a requester who seeks and rewards only the highest-quality solution. On
the other hand, microtask crowdsourcing targets on small tasks that are repetitive and tedious
but easy for an individual to accomplish. Different from crowdsourcing contests, there exists no
competition among workers in microtask crowdsourcing. In particular, workers will be paid a
prescribed reward per task they complete, which is typically a small amount of money ranging
from a few cents to a few dollars.
We focus on microtask crowdsourcing in this paper. With the access to large and relatively
cheap online labor pool, microtask crowdsourcing has the advantage of solving large volumes
of small tasks at a much lower price compared with traditional in-house solutions. However,
due to the lack of proper incentives, microtask crowdsourcing suffers from quality issues. Since
workers are paid a fixed amount of money per task they complete, it is profitable for them
to provide random or bad quality solutions in order to increase the number of submissions
within a certain amount of time or effort. It has been reported that most workers on Mturk,
an leading marketplace for microtask crowdsourcing, do not contribute high quality work [5].
To make matters worse, there exists an inherent conflict between incentivizing high quality
solutions from workers and maintaining the low cost advantage of microtask crowdsourcing
for requesters. On the one hand, requesters typically have a very low budget for each task in
microtask crowdsourcing. On the other hand, the implementation of incentive mechanisms is
costly as the operation of verifying the quality of submitted solutions is expensive [6]. Such a
conflict makes it challenging to design incentives for microtask crowdsourcing, which motivates
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3us to ask the following question: what incentive mechanisms should requesters employ to collect
high quality solutions in a cost-effective way?
In this paper, we address this question from a game-theoretic perspective. In particular, we
investigate a model with strategic workers, where the primary objective of a worker is to
maximize his own utility, defined as the reward he will receive minus the cost of producing
solutions of a certain quality. Based on this model, we first study two basic mechanisms widely
adopted in existing microtask crowdsourcing applications. In particular, the first mechanism
assigns the same task to multiple workers, identifies the correct solution for each task using a
majority voting rule and rewards workers whose solution agrees with the correct one. The second
mechanism assigns each task only to one worker, evaluates the quality of submitted solutions
directly and rewards workers accordingly. We show that in order to obtain high quality solutions
using these two mechanisms, the unit cost incurred by requesters per task is subject to a lower
bound constraint, which is beyond the control of requesters and can be high enough to negate
the low cost advantage of microtask crowdsourcing.
To tackle this challenge, we then propose a cost-effective mechanism that employs quality-
aware worker training as a tool to stimulate workers to provide high quality solutions. In current
microtask crowdsourcing applications, training tasks are usually assigned to workers at the very
beginning and therefore is irrelevant to the quality of their submitted solutions. We show that
assigning training tasks to workers when they perform poorly rather than uniformly at the
beginning can effectively stimulate workers to produce high quality solutions. In particular, we
prove theoretically that the proposed mechanism, when properly designed, can obtain high quality
solutions with an arbitrarily low cost. Beyond its theoretical guarantees, we further conduct
a serial of behavioral experiments to test our proposed mechanism. Our experimental results
demonstrated the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism, and more generally the idea of
quality-aware worker training, in stimulating high quality solutions at low costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work. We introduce
our model in Section III and study two basic mechanisms in Section IV. Then, in Section V,
we describe the design of a cost-effective mechanism based on quality-aware worker training
and analyze its performance. We show simulation results in Section VI and our experimental
verifications in Section VII. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section VIII.
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4II. RELATED WORK
Most of existing work on quality control for microtask crowdsourcing focuses on filtering and
processing low quality submitted solutions [6] - [10]. As oppose to such approaches, we study
how to incentivize workers to produce high quality solutions in the first place. There has recently
been work addressing incentives of crowdsourcing contests from game-theoretic perspectives by
modeling these contests as all-pay auctions [11] - [13]. Nevertheless, these models can not
apply to our scenario as there exists no competition among workers in the context of microtask
crowdsourcing.
There is a small literature that addresses incentives for microtask crowdsourcing. In [14],
Shaw et al. conducted an experiment to compare the effectiveness of a collection of social
and finical incentive mechanisms. In [15], Singer and Mittal proposed a pricing scheme for
microtask crowdsourcing where tasks are dynamically priced and allocated to workers based on
their bids. A reputation-based incentive mechanism was proposed and analyzed for microtask
crowdsourcing in [16]. Our work differs from these studies in that they do not consider the
validation cost incurred by requesters in their models. For microtask crowdsourcing, the operation
of verifying the quality of submitted solutions is so expensive that will negate its low cost
advantage, which places a unique and practical challenge in the design of incentives. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work that studies cost-effective incentive mechanisms for
microtask crowdsourcing.
III. THE MODEL
There are two main components in our model: requesters, who publish tasks; and workers,
who produce solutions to the posted tasks. The submitted solutions can have varying quality,
which is described by a one-dimensional value. Requesters maintain certain criteria on whether
or not a submitted solution should be accepted. Only acceptable solutions are useful to requesters.
Workers produce solutions to the posted tasks in return for reward provided by requesters. We
assume workers are strategic, i.e., they choose the quality of their solutions selfishly to maximize
their own utilities.
In our model, a mechanism describes how requesters evaluate the submitted solutions and
reward workers accordingly. Mechanisms are designed by requesters with the aim of obtaining
high quality solutions from workers, which should be published at the same time as tasks are
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5posted. Mechanisms can be costly to requesters, which negates the advantages of crowdsourcing.
In this work, we focus on mechanisms that not only can incentivize high quality solutions from
workers, but also are cost-effective. We now formally describe the model.
Worker Model. We model the action of workers as the quality q of their solutions. The
value q represents the probability of this solution is acceptable to requesters, which implies that
q ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the solution space is infinite and the probability of two workers
submitting the same unacceptable solution is 0. The cost incurred by a worker depends on the
quality of solution he chooses to produce: a worker can produce a solution of quality q at a cost
c(q). We make the following assumptions on the cost function c(·):
1) c(q) is convex in q.
2) c(q) is differentiable in q.
3) c′(q) > 0, i.e., solutions with higher quality are more costly to produce.
4) c(0) > 0, i.e., even producing 0 quality solutions will incur some cost.
The benefit of a worker corresponds to the received reward, which depends on the quality
of his solution, the mechanism being used and possibly the quality of other workers’ solutions.
We focus on symmetric scenarios, which means the benefit of a worker is evaluated under the
assumption that all the other workers choose the same action (which may be different from
the action of the worker under consideration). Denote by VM(q, q˜) the benefit of a worker
who submits a solution of quality q while other workers produce solutions with quality q˜ and
mechanism M is employed by the requester. A quasi-linear utility is adopted, where the utility
of a worker is the difference between his benefit and his cost:
uM(q, q˜) = VM(q, q˜)− c(q). (1)
Mechanism Choice. Requesters employ mechanisms to incentivize high quality solutions from
self-interested workers. Therefore, the action chosen by workers in response to a mechanism can
be used to indicate the effectiveness of this mechanism. In particular, we will be interested in
a desirable outcome where workers choose q = 1 as their optimal actions, i.e., self-interested
workers are willing to contribute with the highest quality solutions. We would like to emphasize
that such an outcome is practical in that microtasks are typically simple tasks that are easy for
workers to accomplish satisfactorily. On the other hand, in a mechanism M, there is a unit cost
CM per task incurred by the requester, which comes from the reward paid to workers and the
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6cost for evaluating submitted solutions. We refer to such a unit cost CM as the mechanism cost
of M. Since one of the main advantages of microtask crowdsourcing is its low cost, mechanisms
should be designed to achieve the desirable outcome with low mechanism cost. Therefore, to
study a certain mechanism, we wish to address the following questions: (a) under what conditions
can we achieve the desirable outcome? and (b) what are the minimum mechanism cost and the
corresponding parameter settings?
Validation Approaches. As an essential step towards incentivizing high quality solutions, a
mechanism should be able to evaluate the quality of submitted solutions. We describe below three
approaches considered in this paper, which are also commonly adopted in existing microtask
crowdsourcing applications.
The first approach is majority voting, where requesters assign the same task to multiple workers
and accept the solution that submitted by the majority of workers as the correct one. Clearly, the
validation cost of majority voting depends on the number of workers per task. It has been reported
that, if assigning the same task to more than 10 workers, the cost of microtask crowdsourcing
solutions is comparable to that of in-house solutions [6] and when the number of tasks is large,
it is financially impractical to assign the same task to too many workers, e.g., more than 3 [5].
Therefore, when majority voting is adopted in incentive mechanisms, a key question need to be
addressed: what is the minimum required number of workers per task to achieve the desirable
outcome?
Second, requesters can use tasks with known solutions, which we refer to as gold standard
tasks, to evaluate the submitted answers. Validation with gold standard tasks is expensive since
correct answers are costly to obtain. More importantly, as the main objective of requesters in
microtask crowdsourcing is to collect solutions for tasks, gold standard tasks can only be used
occasionally for the purpose of assessing workers, e.g., as training tasks.
Note that both majority voting and gold standard tasks assume implicity that the task has a
unique correct solution, which may not hold for creative tasks, e.g., writing a short description
of a city. In this case, a quality control group [17] can be used to evaluate the submitted
solution. In particularly, the quality group can be either a group of on-site experts who verify
the quality of submitted solution manually or another group of workers who work on quality
control tasks designed by the requesters. In the first case, the time and cost spent on evaluating
the submitted solutions is typically comparable to that of performing the task itself. In the second
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7case, requesters not only have to investigate time and effort in designing quality control tasks
but also need to pay workers for working these tasks. Therefore, validation using quality control
group is also an expensive operation.
IV. BASIC INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
We study in this section two basic mechanisms that are widely employed in existing microtask
crowdsourcing applications. Particularly, for each mechanism, we characterize conditions under
which workers will choose q = 1 as their best responses and study the minimum mechanism
cost for achieving it.
A. A Reward Consensus Mechanism
We first consider a mechanism that employs majority voting as its validation approach and,
when a consensus is reached, rewards workers who submitted the consensus solution. We refer
to such a mechanism as the reward consensus mechanism and denote it by Mc. In Mc, a task
is assigned to K+1 different workers. We assume that K is an even number and is greater than
0. If the same solution is submitted by no less than K/2 + 1 workers, then it is chosen as the
correct solution. Workers are paid the prescribed reward r if they submit the correct solution.
On the other hand, workers will receive no payments if their submitted solutions are different
from the correct one or if no correct solution can be identified, i.e., no consensus is reached.
In Mc, the benefit of each worker depends not only on his own action but also on other
workers’ actions. Therefore, a worker will condition his decision making on others’ actions,
which results in couplings in workers’ actions. To capture such interactions among workers, we
adopt the solution concept of symmetric Nash equilibrium, which can be formally stated as:
Definition 1 (Symmetric Nash Equilibrium of Mc). The q∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in
Mc if q∗ is the best response of a worker when other workers are choosing q∗.
We show below the necessary and sufficient conditions of q∗ = 1 being a symmetric Nash
equilibrium in Mc.
Proposition 1. In Mc, q∗ = 1 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if and only if r ≥ c′(1).
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8Proof: Under the assumption that the probability of any two workers submitting the same
unacceptable solution is zero (which is reasonable as there are infinitely possible solutions), we
can calculate the utility of an worker who produces solutions of quality q while other workers
choose action q˜ as
uMc(q, q˜) = rq
K∑
n=K/2
K!
n!(K − n)!
q˜n(1− q˜)K−n − c(q).
According to Definition 1, q∗ is a symmetric Nash Equilibrium of Mc if and only if
q∗ ∈ arg max
q∈[0,1]
uMc(q, q
∗). (2)
Since uMc(q, 1) = rq−c(q) is a concave function of q and q ∈ [0, 1], the necessary and sufficient
condition of q∗ = 1 being a symmetric Nash equilibrium can be derived as
∂uMc(q, 1)
∂q
|q=1 = r − c
′(1) ≥ 0. (3)
From Proposition 1, we can see that Mc can enforce self-interested workers to produce the
highest quality solutions as long as the prescribed reward r is larger than a certain threshold.
Surprisingly, this threshold depends purely on the worker’s cost function and is irrelevant to the
number of workers. The mechanism cost of Mc can be calculated as
CMc = (K + 1)r ≥ (K + 1)c
′(1). (4)
Therefore, to minimize the mechanism cost, it is optimal to choose the minimum value of K,
i.e., K = 2, and let r = c′(1). In this way, requesters can achieve q∗ = 1 with the minimum
mechanism cost C∗Mc = 3c
′(1). Having more workers working on the same task will only increase
the mechanism cost while not helping to improve the quality of submitted solutions.
B. A Reward Accuracy Mechanism
Next, we consider a mechanism that rewards a worker purely based on his own submitted
solutions. Such a mechanism is referred to as the reward accuracy mechanism and is denoted by
Ma. In particular, depending on the characteristics of tasks, Ma will use either gold standard
tasks or the quality control group to verify whether a submitted solution is acceptable or not. In
our discussions, however, we make no distinctions between the two methods. We assume that
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9the validation cost per task is d and there is a certain probability ǫ ≪ 1 that a mistake will be
made in deciding whether a solution is acceptable or not.
As we have discussed, these validation operations are expensive and should be used rarely.
Therefore, Ma only evaluates randomly a fraction of submitted solutions to reduce the mech-
anism cost. Formally, in Ma, requesters verify a submitted solution with probability αa. If a
submitted solution is acceptable or not evaluated, the worker will receive the prescribed reward
r. On the other hand, if the solution being evaluated is unacceptable, the worker will not be
paid.
In Ma, the utility of a worker is irrelevant to actions of other workers. Therefore, we write
the utility of a worker who produces solutions of quality q as
uMa(q) = r [(1− αa) + αa(1− ǫ)q + αaǫ(1 − q)]− c(q).
Let q∗ represent the optimal action of a worker by which his utility function is maximized.
Since uMa(q) is a concave function of q and q ∈ [0, 1], we can derive the necessary and sufficient
conditions of q∗ = 1 as
αa ≥
c′(1)
(1− 2ǫ)r
. (5)
We can see that there is a lower bound on possible values of αa, which depends on the cost
function of workers and the prescribed reward r. Since αa ∈ [0, 1], for the above condition to
hold, we must have r ≥ c
′(1)
(1−2ǫ)
. Moreover, we can calculate the mechanism cost in the case of
q∗ = 1 as
CMa = (1− αaǫ)r + αad.
Requesters optimize the mechanism cost by choosing the sampling probability αa and the
reward r. Therefore, we can calculate the minimum mechanism cost as
C∗Ma = min
c′(1)
(1−2ǫ)r
≤αa≤1, r≥
c′(1)
(1−2ǫ)
(1− αaǫ)r + αad. (6)
By solving the above convex optimization problem using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
[18], we get
C∗Ma =


2
√
c′(1)d
1−2ǫ
− ǫ c
′(1)
1−2ǫ
, if d ≥ c
′(1)
1−2ǫ
,
c′(1)(1−ǫ)
1−2ǫ
+ d, otherwise.
(7)
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Moreover, the optimal parameters for achieving the minimum mechanism cost are

α∗a =
√
c′(1)
(1−2ǫ
)d, r∗ =
√
c′(1)d
1−2ǫ
, if d ≥ c
′(1)
1−2ǫ
,
α∗a = 1, r
∗ = c
′(1)
1−2ǫ
, otherwise.
(8)
Similarly as the reward consensus mechanism, the mechanism cost of the reward accuracy
mechanism must be greater than a certain value in order for requesters to collect solutions with
the highest quality from workers.
V. REDUCING MECHANISM COST BY QUALITY-AWARE WORKER TRAINING
From our discussions above, we can see that for the two basic mechanisms to achieve
the desirable outcome, their mechanism costs are constrained by some lower bounds, i.e., the
minimum mechanism costs. These minimum mechanism costs are determined by worker’s cost
function and possibly the validation cost, all of which are beyond the control of requesters. If
these minimum mechanism costs are large, requesters will have to either lower their standards
and suffer from low quality solutions or switch to other alternative approaches.
To overcome this issue, we introduce a new mechanism Mt, which employs quality-aware
worker training as a tool to stimulate self-interested workers to submit high quality solutions.
Our proposed mechanism is built on top of the basic mechanisms to further reduce the required
mechanism cost. In particular, there are two states in Mt: the working state, where workers
work on standard tasks in return for reward; and the training state, where workers do a set of
training tasks to gain qualifications for the working state.
In the working state, we consider a general model which incorporates both the reward con-
sensus mechanism and the reward accuracy mechanism. We assume that with probability 1−βw,
a task will go through the reward consensus mechanism and with probability βw, the reward
accuracy mechanism will be used with the sampling probability αw. According to our results in
Section IV-A, it is optimal to assign 3 workers per task when the reward consensus mechanism
is being used. In the working state, a submitted solution will be accepted by Mt if it is accepted
by either the reward consensus mechanism or the reward accuracy mechanism. A submitted
solution will be rejected otherwise. When a solution is accepted, the worker will receive the
prescribed reward r and can continue working on more tasks in the working state. On the other
hand, if a worker’s solution is rejected, he will not be paid for this task and will be put into the
training state to earn his qualifications for future tasks. Let Pw(q˜w, qw) represent the probability
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Fig. 1. The state transition diagram of our proposed mechanism Mt.
of a solution with quality qw being accepted in the working state when other submitted solutions
are of quality q˜w. We have
Pw(q˜w, qw) =(1− βw)qw
[
q˜2w + 2q˜w(1− q˜w)
]
+ βw(1− αw) + βwαw[(1− 2ǫ)qw + ǫ]. (9)
The immediate utility of a worker at the working state can be calculated as
uwMt(q˜w, qw) = rPw(q˜w, qw)− c(qw). (10)
In the training state, each worker will receive a set of N training tasks. To evaluate the
submitted solutions, an approach similar to the reward accuracy mechanism is adopted. In
particular, a worker is chosen to be evaluated at random with probability αt. A chosen worker
will pass the evaluation and gain the permission to working state if M out N solutions are
correct. We assume M = N in our analysis while our results can be easily extended to more
general cases. An unselected worker will be granted the permission to working state next time.
Only workers who fail the evaluation will stay in the training state and receive another set of
N training tasks. We denote by Pt(qt) the probability of a worker who produces solutions of
quality qt being allowed to enter the working state next time, which can be calculated as
Pt(qt) = (1− αt) + αt[(1− 2ǫ)qt + ǫ]
N . (11)
The immediate utility of a worker at the training state is
utMt(qt) = −Nc(qt). (12)
To summarize, we plot the state transitions of Mt in Fig. 1. We further assume that at the
end of each time slot, a worker will leave the system with probability 1 − δ, where δ ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, a new worker will enter the system immediately after an existing one left. New
August 27, 2018 DRAFT
12
workers will be placed randomly into the working state or the training state according to an
initial state distribution specified by the requester.
From (10) and (12), we can see that workers’ immediate utility in Mt depends not only on
their actions but also on which state they are in. Moreover, as the state transition probabilities
depend on workers’ actions according to (9) and (11), taking a certain action will affect not
only the immediate utility but also the future utility. For example, a worker may increase his
immediate utility by submitting poor solutions at the working state but suffer from the loss of
being placed into the training state next time. Given the dependence of future utility on current
actions, as rational decision makers, workers will choose their actions to optimize their long-
term utility. Formally, we denote by UwMt(q˜w, qw, qt) the long-term expected utility of a worker
who is currently at the working state and chooses action qw for the working state and action qt
for the training state while others choosing action q˜w at the working state. Similarly, we write
U tMt(q˜w, qw, qt) for the long-term expected utility at the training state. We have
UwMt(q˜w, qw, qt) =u
w
Mt
(q˜w, qw)+δ
[
Pw(q˜w, qw)U
w
Mt
(q˜w, qw, qt)+(1−Pw(q˜w, qw))U
t
Mt
(q˜w, qw, qt)
]
, (13)
U tMt(q˜w, qw, qt) =u
t
Mt
(qt) + δ
[
Pt(qt)U
w
Mt
(q˜w, qw, qt) + (1− Pt(qt))U
t
Mt
(q˜w, qw, qt)
]
. (14)
Based on the definition of worker’s long-term expected utility, we adopt the symmetric Nash
equilibrium as the solution concept in mechanism Mt, which is formally defined as
Definition 2 (Symmetric Nash Equilibrium of Mt). The action pair (qˆw, qˆt) is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium of Mt, if ∀qw ∈ [0, 1] and ∀qt ∈ [0, 1], the following two conditions hold
UwMt(qˆw, qˆw, qˆt) ≥ U
w
Mt
(qˆw, qw, qt), (15)
U tMt(qˆw, qˆw, qˆt) ≥ U
t
Mt
(qˆw, qw, qt). (16)
The above definition suggests a way to verify whether an action pair (qˆw, qˆt) of interest is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium or not, which can be summarized as the following three steps.
1) Assume all workers are adopting (qˆw, qˆt) and one worker of interest may deviate from it.
2) Find the optimal action (q∗w, q∗t ) for this worker.
3) The action pair (qˆw, qˆt) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if and only if it is consistent with
the optimal action pair (q∗w, q∗t ), i.e., qˆw = q∗w and qˆt = q∗t .
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The key challenge here is to find the optimal action pair for a worker given the other workers’
action, which can be modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). In this MDP formulation,
the state set includes the working state and the training state, the action in each state is the
quality of solutions to produce, rewards are the immediate utility specified in (10) and (12), and
transition probabilities are given in (9) and (11).
Note that in our discussions so far we assume stationary actions, i.e., workers’ actions are
time-invariant functions of the state. Such an assumption can be justified by properties of MDP
as shown in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Any worker cannot improve his long-term expected utility by choosing time-
variant actions, if all the other workers’ action at the working state is stationary, i.e., ∀qw ∈ [0, 1],
UwMt(qw, q
∗
w(τ), q
∗
t (τ)) = U
w
Mt
(qw, q
∗
w, q
∗
t ),
U tMt(qw, q
∗
w(τ), q
∗
t (τ)) = U
t
Mt
(qw, q
∗
w, q
∗
t ),
where (q∗w(τ), q∗t (τ)) is the optimal time-variant action pair and (q∗w, q∗t ) is the optimal stationary
action pair, given other workers’ action qw.
Proof: The problem of finding the optimal action pair for a worker given the other workers’
action can be formulated as a MDP. In this MDP formulation, rewards and transition probabilities
are stationary if other workers’ action at the working state is stationary. In addition, the state
space is stationary and finite and the action space is stationary and compact. Moreover, the
rewards and transition probabilities are continuous in actions. Therefore, according to Theorem
6.2.10 in [19], there exits a deterministic stationary action rule by which the optimal utility
of this MDP can be achieved. In other words, choosing any random, time-variant and history
dependent action rules will not lead to a higher utility.
Among all possible symmetric Nash equilibria, we are interested in ones where qˆw = 1,
i.e., workers will produce solutions with the highest quality at the working state. Note that we
do not guarantee solution quality at the training state since in Mt, the working state serves
the production purpose whereas the training state is designed as an auxiliary state to enhance
workers’ performance at the working state. Solutions collected from the training state will only
be used for assessing workers and should be discarded afterwards. We would like to characterize
conditions under which such symmetric Nash equilibria exist. Toward this end, we will follow
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the three steps outlined above with an emphasize on solving the MDP to find the optimal action
pair. Our results are summarized in the following proposition, where we present a necessary and
sufficient condition on the existence of symmetric Nash equilibria with qˆw = 1.
Proposition 3. There exists qˆt ∈ [0, 1] such that (1, qˆt) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of Mt
if and only if
UwMt(1, 1, qˆt)− U
t
Mt
(1, 1, qˆt) ≥
c′(1)
δ [(1− βw) + βwαw(1− 2ǫ)]
−
r
δ
. (17)
Proof: To show the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium with qˆw = 1, we first assume
that all workers are choosing the action pair (1, qˆt) except one worker under consideration. Since
interactions among workers only occur at the working state, the value of qˆt will not affect the
decision of this particular worker.
Next, we characterize the optimal action pair (q∗w, q∗t ) for this particular worker. The problem
of finding the optimal action pair of a certain worker can be modeled as a MDP where the
necessary and sufficient conditions of an action pair being optimal are given in (15) and (16).
Nevertheless, it is not easy to derive the optimal action pair directly from these conditions.
Therefore, we need to find another set of equivalent conditions. Since in our MDP formulation,
0 < δ < 1, the state space is finite and the immediate reward is bounded, Theorem 6.2.7 in [19]
shows that an action pair (q∗w, q∗t ) is optimal if and only if it satisfies the following optimality
equations
q∗w ∈ arg max
0≤qw≤1
{
uwMt(1, qw)+δ
[
Pw(1, qw)U
w
Mt
(1, q∗w, q
∗
t )+(1−Pw(1, qw))U
t
Mt
(1, q∗w, q
∗
t )
]}
, (18)
q∗t ∈ arg max
0≤qt≤1
{
utMt(qt) + δ
[
Pt(qt)U
w
Mt
(1, q∗w, q
∗
t ) + (1− Pt(qt))U
t
Mt
(1, q∗w, q
∗
t )
]}
, (19)
and that there exits at least one optimal action pair.
Since the above optimality equations hold for any value of qˆt, we set qˆt = q∗t . Then, to prove
that there exists an symmetric Nash equilibrium (qˆw, qˆt) with qˆw = 1, it suffices to show that
q∗w = 1. Substituting (10) into (18) and after some manipulations, we have
q∗w ∈ arg max
0≤qw≤1
{[
r + δUwMt(1, q
∗
w, q
∗
t )− δU
t
Mt
(1, q∗w, q
∗
t )
]
Pw(1, qw)− c(qw)
}
. (20)
From (9), we know
Pw(1, qw) = [(1− βw) + βwαw(1− 2ǫ)] qw + βw(1− αw) + βwαwǫ. (21)
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Substituting (21) into (20), we have
q∗w ∈ arg max
0≤qw≤1
{
[(1− βw) + βwαw(1− 2ǫ)]
[
r + δUwMt(1, q
∗
w, q
∗
t )− δU
t
Mt
(1, q∗w, q
∗
t )
]
qw − c(qw)
}
.
Recall that c(qw) is a convex function of qw. We can thus derive the necessary and sufficient
condition for q∗w = 1 as
[(1− βw) + βwαw(1− 2ǫ)]
[
r + δUwMt(1, 1, q
∗
t )− δU
t
Mt
(1, 1, q∗t )
]
≥ c′(1), (22)
which is also the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the symmetric Nash
equilibrium (qˆw, qˆt) with qˆw = 1. Replacing q∗t with qˆt, we obtain the condition in (17) and
complete the proof.
In the above proposition, we show that it is an equilibrium for self-interested workers to
produce solutions with quality 1 at the working state as long as the condition in (17) holds.
Nevertheless, this condition is hard to evaluate since neither the equilibrium action at the training
state, qˆt, nor the optimal long-term utility UwMt(1, 1, qˆt) and U
t
Mt
(1, 1, qˆt) are known to requesters.
On the other hand, we hope to find conditions that can provide guide requesters in choosing
proper parameters for mechanism Mt. Therefore, based on results of Proposition 3, we present
in the following a sufficient condition on the existence of desirable equilibria, which is also easy
to evaluate.
Theorem 1. In Mt, if the number of training tasks N is large enough, i.e.,
N ≥
1
c(0)
[
(1 + δβwαwǫ)c
′(1)
δ(1− βw) + δβwαw(1− 2ǫ)
−
δ + 1
δ
r + c(1)
]
, (23)
then there exits a symmetric Nash equilibrium (qˆw, qˆt) such that qˆw = 1.
Proof: We first obtain a lower bound on UwMt(1, 1, qˆt)−U tMt(1, 1, qˆt) and then combine this
lower bound with Proposition 3 to prove Theorem 1.
Let U(qw, qt) ,
[
UwMt(1, qw, qt) U
t
Mt
(1, qw, qt)
]T
. Then, from (13) and (14), we have
(I− δQ(qw, qt))U(qw, qt) = b(qw, qt), (24)
where I is a 2 by 2 identity matrix, b(qw, qt) , [uwMt(1, qw) utMt(qt)]T and
Q(qw, qt) ,

 Pw(1, qw) 1− Pw(1, qw)
Pt(qt) 1− Pt(qt)

 . (25)
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Since 0 < δ < 1, it can be proved according to the Corollary C.4 in [19] that matrix (I −
δQ(qw, qt)) is invertible. Therefore, we can obtain the long-term utility vector of action pair
(qw, qt) as
U(qw, qt) = (I− δQ(qw, qt))
−1
b(qw, qt). (26)
Based on (26), we have
UwMt(1, qw, qt)− U
t
Mt
(1, qw, qt) = [1 −1]U(qw, qt)
=
uwMt(1, qw)− u
t
Mt
(qt)
1 + δ [Pt(qt)− Pw(1, qw)]
. (27)
The above results hold for ∀qw ∈ [0, 1] and ∀qt ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for a desired action pair
(1, qˆt), we have
UwMt(1, 1, qˆt)− U
t
Mt
(1, 1, qˆt) =
uwMt(1, 1)− u
t
Mt
(qˆt)
1 + δ [Pt(qˆt)− Pw(1, 1)]
=
(1− βwαwǫ)r − c(1) +Nc(qˆt)
1 + δ {1− αt + αt[(1− 2ǫ)qˆt + ǫ]N − (1− βwαwǫ)}
≥
(1− βwαwǫ)r − c(1) +Nc(0)
1 + δβwαwǫ
. (28)
Since [(1− 2ǫ)qˆt + ǫ]N ≤ 1, the inequality in (28) is derived by replacing [(1− 2ǫ)qˆt + ǫ]N with
1 and by using the fact that c(q) is monotonically increasing in q.
Therefore, the condition in (17) is guaranteed to hold if
(1− βwαwǫ)r − c(1) +Nc(0)
1 + δβwαwǫ
≥
c′(1)
δ [(1− βw) + βwαw(1− 2ǫ)]
−
r
δ
,
which leads to the sufficient condition in (23).
Theorem 1 shows that given any possible settings (αw, βw, r, αt) in Mt, we can always enforce
workers to produce solutions with quality 1 at the working state by choosing a sufficiently large
N . Such a property makes it possible for requesters to control their cost while obtaining high
quality solutions. We discuss the mechanism cost of Mt in the following subsection.
A. Mechanism Cost
For requesters, the mechanism cost of Mt at the desirable equilibrium (1, qˆt) can be written
as
CMt = (1− βw) · 3r + βw · [(1− αwǫ)r + αwd] + βw · αwǫ
∞∑
k=0
[1− Pt(qˆt)]
k αtNd,
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where the last term corresponds to the cost of validation in the training state. Since ǫ ≪ 1, it
follows that Pt(qˆt) ≥ 1− αt + αtǫN . Therefore, we have
CMt ≤ 3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwǫ)r + αwd] +
αt
1− αt(1− ǫN)
βwαwǫNd.
We then design parameters of Mt according to the following procedure: (a) select working
state parameters αw, βw and r, (b) choose N such that (28) holds, (c) design αt such that
αt
1− αt(1− ǫN)
βwαwǫNd ≤ γ{3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwǫ)r + αwd]}, (29)
where γ > 0 is a parameter chosen by requesters to control the relative cost of training state to
working state. The inequality in (29) is equivalent to
αt ≤
γ{3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwǫ)r + αwd]}
γ(1− ǫN ){3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwǫ)r + αwd]}+ βwαwǫNd
. (30)
Following the above design procedure, we have
CMt ≤ (1 + γ) [3r(1− βw) + βw((1− αwǫ)r + αwd)] .
If αw and r are chosen to minimize the cost, we have
C∗Mt = inf0<αw≤1,r>0
(1 + γ) [3r(1− βw) + βw((1− αwǫ)r + αwd)] = 0,
which illustrates that our proposed mechanism Mt enables requesters to obtain high quality
solutions with an arbitrarily low cost.
Moreover, from the above design procedure, the significance of our proposed mechanism
can be interpreted from another perspective. That is, through the introduction of quality-aware
worker training, our proposed mechanism can be built on top of any basic mechanisms to bring
requesters an extra degree of freedom in their design. They can now freely choose working state
parameters, e.g., αw, βw and r, without concerning the constraint of incentivizing high quality
solutions, which will be automatically guaranteed through the design of training state parameters.
B. Stationary State Distribution
In above discussions, we focus on the quality of submitted solutions at the working state, while
there is no guarantee of solution quality at the training state. This is sufficient for requesters to
high quality solutions as the training state only serves as an axillary state and will not be used
for production. On the other hand, the system efficiency of Mt depends on the probability of a
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worker being at the working state. If such a probability is small, Mt will have low efficiency
as a large portion of workers are not contributing to actual tasks
Therefore, to fully study the performance of Mt, we analyze the stationary state distribution
of Mt in this subsection. We denote by πnw the probability of a worker being at the working
state at the nth time slot after entering the platform. The probability of being at the training
state is thus (1− πnw). We denote by π∞w and π0w the stationary state distribution and initial state
distribution, respectively. Note that the initial state distribution π0w is a design aspect that can be
controlled by requesters, i.e., requesters can decide whether a new worker starts at the working
state or at the training state. Our main result is a lower bound of π∞w as shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. In Mt, if workers follow a desirable symmetric Nash equilibrium (1, qˆt), then
the stationary state distribution π∞w will be reached and
π∞w ≥
(1− δ)π0w + δ(1− αt)
1− δ + δβwαwǫ+ δ(1− αt)
(31)
Proof: Assuming that all workers are adopting the action pair (1, qˆt), then we can write the
state distribution update rule as
πn+1w = δπ
n
wPw(1, 1) + δ(1− π
n
w)Pt(qˆt) + (1− δ)π
0
w
= δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(qˆt)] π
n
w + (1− δ)π
0
w + δPt(qˆt). (32)
If the stationary state distribution π∞w exists, it must satisfy
π∞w = δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(qˆt)]π
∞
w + (1− δ)π
0
w + δPt(qˆt). (33)
Therefore, we have
π∞w =
(1− δ)π0w + δPt(qˆt)
1− δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(qˆt)]
=
(1− δ)π0w + δ
{
(1− αt) + αt[(1− 2ǫ)qˆt + ǫ]
N
}
1− δ(1− βwαwǫ) + δ {(1− αt) + αt[(1− 2ǫ)qˆt + ǫ]N}
≥
(1− δ)π0w + δ(1− αt)
1− δ + δβwαwǫ+ δ(1− αt)
.
The last inequality holds since [(1− 2ǫ)qˆt + ǫ]N ≥ 0 and π∞w is monotonically increasing as the
value of [(1− 2ǫ)qˆt + ǫ]N increases.
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Next, we show that the stationary distribution π∞w will be reached. From (32) and (33), we
have
πn+1w − π
∞
w = δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(qˆt)] (π
n
w − π
∞
w ).
Since |δ [Pw(1, 1)− Pt(qˆt)] | < 1, we have
lim
n→∞
(πnw − π
∞
w ) = 0⇒ lim
n→∞
πnw = π
∞
w .
From Proposition 4, we can see the lower bound of π∞w increases as π0w increases. Since the
larger π∞w means higher efficiency, requesters should choose π0w = 1 for optimal performance.
Therefore, we have
π∞w ≥ 1−
δβwαwǫ
1− δ + δ(1− αt) + δβwαwǫ
. (34)
When βw = 0, i.e., only the reward consensus is employed at the working state, or in the ideal
case of ǫ = 0, we can conclude that π∞w = 1. This implies that every newly entered worker will
first work at the working state, choose to produce solutions with the highest quality as their best
responses and keep on working in the working state until they leave the system. As a result, all
workers will stay at the working state and are available to solve posted tasks.
On the other hand, when βw > 0 and ǫ > 0, although all workers will start with the working
state and choose to produce solutions with quality 1, a portion of them will be put into the
training state due to validation mistakes of requesters. However, since the probability of error is
usually very small, i.e., ǫ≪ 1, we can still expect π∞w to be very close to 1, which implies that
the majority of workers will be at the working state.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we conduct numerical simulations to examine properties of our proposed
mechanism Mt and to compare its performance with that of the basic mechanisms Mc and
Ma. Throughout the simulations, we assume the following cost function for workers
c(q) =
(q + λ)2
(λ+ 1)2
, (35)
where λ > 0 is a parameter that controls the degree of sensitivity of a worker’s cost to his
action. In particular, the smaller λ is, the more sensitive a worker’s cost will be with respect
to his actions. In addition, the cost of choosing the highest quality 1 is normalized to be 1, i.e,
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Fig. 2. The lower bound of N for the existence of desirable symmetric Nash equilibria when βw = 0.
c(1) = 1. From the definition of c(q), we also have c(0) = λ2
(λ+1)2
and c′(1) = 2
(λ+1)
. Moreover,
we set d = 10, δ = 0.9 and ǫ = 0.01 throughout the simulations.
In the first simulation, we evaluate the sufficient condition for the existence of desirable
symmetric Nash equilibria in (28) under different settings. Such a sufficient condition is expressed
in the form of a lower bound on the number of required training tasks, which depends on the
worker’s cost function as well as working state parameters βw, αw and r. We set r = 1, which
matches the cost of producing solutions with quality 1. Moreover, since N ≥ 1, when the derived
lower bound of N is less than 1, we set it to be 1 manually.
We show in Fig. 2 the lower bound of N versus λ when βw = 0, i.e., only the reward
consensus mechanism is used in the working state. Since workers are more cost-sensitive in
producing high quality solutions with a smaller λ, it becomes more difficult to make q = 1 as
their best responses. As a result, we need to set relatively large Ns to achieve the desirable
symmetric Nash equilibrium for small λs as shown in Fig. 2. On the other hand, when λ is large
enough, the lower bound in (28) will no longer be an active constraint since any N ≥ 1 can
achieve our design objective.
We then study the more general cases where both the reward consensus mechanism and the
reward accuracy mechanism are adopted in the working state. We show in Fig. 3 the lower bound
of N versus αw under different values of βw and λ. Similarly, we can see that smaller λ leads
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Fig. 3. The lower bound of N for the existence of desirable symmetric Nash equilibria when βw 6= 0.
Fig. 4. The lower bound of pi∞w when βw = 1.
to a larger lower bound of N . Moreover, the lower bound of N also increases as αw decreases.
This is due to the fact that it becomes more difficult to enforce workers to submit high quality
solutions if we evaluate the submitted solutions less frequently. Since βw represents the ratio of
tasks that will be evaluated using the reward accuracy mechanism, the smaller βw is, the less
dependent of the lower bound of N will be on the sampling probability αw.
In the second simulation, we evaluate numerically the lower bound of the stationary probability
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Fig. 5. The long-term expected utility loss of a worker who deviates to action pair (qw, qˆt): (a) βw = 0; (b) βw = 1, αw = 0.1;
(c) βw = 1, αw = 0.9.
of a worker being at the working state, i.e., π∞w under different settings. We consider βw = 1 in
our simulations as π∞w = 1 when βw = 0. In addition,we set π0w = 1, i.e., every newly entered
worker will be placed at the working state. In Fig. 4, we show the lower bound of π∞w under
different values of αw and αt. We can see that the lower bound of π∞w decreases as αw and αt
increases. More importantly, π∞w will be above 0.9 even in the worst case, which indicates that
our proposed mechanism can guarantee the majority of workers being at the working state.
Next, we verify Theorem 1 through numerical simulations. In particular, we assume all workers
adopt the equilibrium action pair (1, qˆt) except one worker under consideration who may deviate
to (qw, qˆt). We set r = 1 and choose N to be the smallest integer that satisfies the sufficient
condition of the existence of desirable symmetric Nash equilibria in (28). We set αt according
to (30) with γ = 1, i.e.,
αt = min
{
{3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwǫ)r + αwd]}
(1− ǫN ){3r(1− βw) + βw [(1− αwǫ)r + αwd]}+ βwαwǫNd
, 1
}
.
Moreover, the equilibrium action at the training state, qˆt, is obtained by solving (18) and (19) us-
ing the well-known value iteration algorithm [19]. We show in Fig 5 the long-term expected utility
loss of the worker under consideration at the working state, i.e., UwMt(1, 1, qˆt)− UwMt(1, qw, qˆt).
From the simulation results, we can see that under all simulated settings, choosing qw = 1 will
always lead to the highest long-term expected utility, i.e., zero long-term expected utility loss.
Therefore, as a rational decision maker, this worker will have no incentive to deviate from the
action (1, qˆt), which demonstrates that (1, qˆt) is indeed sustained as an equilibrium.
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Fig. 6. The equilibrium action versus the mechanism cost inMc.
Finally, we compare the performance of our proposed mechanism Mt with that of the two
basic mechanismsMc and Ma. Since Mt is capable of incentivizing workers to submit solutions
of quality 1 with an arbitrarily low cost, it suffices to show the quality of solutions achieved by
Mc and Ma under different mechanism costs. In particular, for Mc, we assume that a task is
given to 3 workers. Therefore, for a given mechanism cost CMc , the reward to each worker is
r = CMc/3. According to our analysis in Section IV-A, the equilibrium action q∗Mc in Mc can
be calculated as q∗Mc = max{min{q, 1}, 0}, where q is the solution to the following equaiton
r[2q − q2] = c′(q).
In our simulations, when there are multiple equilibria, we pick the one with higher quality. On
the other hand, if there exits no equilibrim, we set q∗Mc = 0. We show curves of the equilibrium
action q∗Mc in Fig. 6. From the simulation results, we can see that Mc can only achieve the
highest quality 1 when the mechanism cost CMc is larger than a certain threshold. Moreover,
such a threshold increases as λ increases, i.e., as workers are more cost sensitive in producing
high quality solutions.
For Ma, we study two cases where αa = 0.2 and αa = 0.8, respectively. Then, given a
mechanism cost CMa , we set r such that
CMa = (1− αaǫ)r + αad.
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Fig. 7. The optimal action versus the mechanism cost inMa: (a) αa = 0.2; (b) αa = 0.8.
Under Ma, workers will respond by choosing their optimal action q∗Ma as
q∗Ma = arg maxq∈[0,1]
uMa(q).
We show the optimal action q∗Ma versus the mechanism cost CMa for Ma in Fig. 7. Similarly,
we can see that requesters are unable to obtain high quality solutions with low CMa.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATIONS
Beyond its theoretical guarantees, we further conduct a set of behavioral experiments to test
our proposed incentive mechanism in practice. We evaluate the performance of participants on a
set of simple computational tasks under different incentive mechanisms. We mainly focused on
the reward accuracy mechanism in the experiment. We found that, through the use of quality-
aware worker training, our proposed mechanism can greatly improve the performance of a basic
reward accuracy mechanism with a low sampling probability to a level that is comparable to the
performance of the basic reward accuracy mechanism with the highest sampling probability. We
describe the experiment in detail below followed by analysis and discussions of the results.
A. Description of The Experiment
The task we used was calculating the sum of two randomly generated double-digit numbers.
To make sure all tasks are of the same difficulty level, we further make the sum of unit digits to
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be less than 10, i.e., there is no carry from the unit digits. The advantage of such a computational
task is that: (a) it is straightforward for participants to understand the rule, (b) each task has a
unique correct solution, (c) the task can be solved correctly with reasonable amount of effort,
and (d) it is easy for us to generate a large number of independent tasks.
In our experiment, participants solve the human computation tasks in exchange for some virtual
points, e.g., 10 points for each accepted solution. Their goal is to maximize the accumulated
points earned during the experiment. Tasks are assigned to each participant in three sets. Each
set has a time limit of 3 minutes and participants can try as many tasks as possible within the
time limit. Such a time limit helps participants to quantify their costs of solving a task with
various qualities using time. Different sets employ different incentive mechanisms. In particular,
Set I employs the basic reward accuracy mechanism Ma with the highest sampling probability
αa = 1. The basic reward accuracy mechanism Ma with a much lower sampling probability
αr = 0.3 is employed in Set II. We use our proposed mechanism Mt in Set III, which introduces
quality-aware worker training to the same basic reward accuracy mechanism as used in Set II
with training state parameters set as αr = 0 and N = 15. Since correct solution can be obtained
for all tasks, we are able to determine the correctness of each solution without error. That is,
we have ǫ = 0 in all cases.
We created a software tool to conduct the experiment. As no interaction among participants
is involved, our experiment was conducted on an individual basis. Before the experiment, each
participant was given a brief introduction to experiment rules as well as a demonstration of the
software tool. There was also an exit survey followed each trial of the experiment, which asked
participants about their strategies.
B. Experimental Results
We have successfully collected results from 41 participants, most of whom are engineering
graduate students. The number of collected submissions per set varies significantly from 30 to
180, depending on both the strategy and skills of different participants. From the requester’s
perspective, the accuracy of each participant represents the quality of submitted solutions and
therefore is a good indicator to the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms. We show the histogram
of accuracy for all three sets in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 8. Histogram of accuracy: (a) Set I; (b) Set II; (c) Set III.
For Set I, as the highest sampling probability, i.e., αa = 1, was adopted, most participants re-
sponded positively by submitting solutions with very high qualities. There is only one participant
who had relatively low accuracy compared with others in that he was playing the strategy of
“avoiding difficult tasks” according to our exit survey. A much lower sampling probability of 0.3
was used for Set II. In this case, it becomes profitable to increase the number of submissions by
submitting lower quality solutions, as most errors will simply not be detected. This explains why
the majority of participants had very low accuracies for Set II. Noteworthily, a few workers, 5
out 41, still exhibited very high accuracies in Set II. Our exit survey suggests that their behaviors
are influenced by a sense of “work ethics”, which prevents them to play strategically to exploit
the mechanism vulnerability. Similar observations have also been reported in [20] and [21]. In
Set III, as the introduction of training tasks make it more costly to submit wrong solutions,
participants need to reevaluate their strategies to achieve a good tradeoff between accuracy and
the number of submitted tasks. From Fig. 8, we can see that the accuracy of participants in Set
III has a very similar distribution as that in Set I.
We now analyze our experimental results qualitatively. Let ΓI , ΓII and ΓIII represent the
accuracy of Set I, Set II and Set III, respectively. Our results show that ΓIII − ΓII follows a
distribution with median significantly greater than 0.6 by the Wilcoxon signed rank test with
significance level of ρ < 5%. On the other hand, the median of the distribution of ΓI − ΓIII
is not significantly greater than 0.01 by the Wilcoxon signed rank test with ρ ≥ 10%. The
unbiased estimate of the variance of ΓI , ΓII and ΓIII are 0.0060, 0.1091 and 0.0107, respectively.
Moreover, according to the Levene’s test with significance level of 5%, the variance of ΓIII is not
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significantly different from that of ΓI while it is indeed significantly different from that of ΓII .
To summarize, through the use of quality-aware worker training, our proposed mechanism can
greatly improve the effectiveness of the basic reward accuracy mechanism with a low sampling
probability to a level that is comparable to the one that has the highest sampling probability.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study cost-effective mechanisms for microtask crowdsourcing. In particular,
we first consider two basic mechanisms widely adopted in existing microtask crowdsourcing
applications and show that, to obtain high quality solutions, their mechanism costs must be
higher than some lower bounds. Such lower bounds are beyond the control of requesters and may
be high enough to negate the advantage of microtask crowdsourcing. Then, we propose a cost-
effective mechanism based on quality-aware worker training. We prove theoretically that, given an
arbitrarily low cost, our proposed mechanism can be designed to sustain a desirable equilibrium
where workers choose to produce solutions with the highest quality at the working state and a
worker will be at the working state with a large probability. Beyond its theoretical guarantees,
we further conduct a set of human behavior experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
proposed mechanism.
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